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The determination of international reserve balance for emerging econo-
mies is part of the efforts to strengthen the immunity of these economies to
crises. However, there is still evidence on crises even for the countries with
large foreign reserves. It has usually been experienced that the countries
with greatest need for reserves economize more than others on their
holdings since they might underestimate the cost of crisis. In this study,
the official international reserves of Turkey are tested against optimality
and adequacy. During 1988–2002, the actual reserves fell short of both the
optimal and the adequate levels. They are only optimal when the expected
cumulative contraction is about 5.2% of real GDP under crisis. However,
early evidence from emerging economies and Turkey show that crises
hit more heavily. Hence, it is found that the current financial structure
in Turkey such as the absence of capital controls and a highly dollarized
banking system necessitates more foreign reserves for preventing any
future economic and/or financial shocks.
I. Introduction
The recent evidence that countries holding large
reserves during the Asian crisis managed to avoid
financial attacks renewed the interest on the better
management of international reserves. Feldstein
(1999) emphasized that emerging markets should
stop depending on international organizations such
as the IMF to protect themselves from currency crises
but to increase their liquidity at a reasonable cost.
Those who support holding a lot of reserves argue
that the opportunity cost of stockpiling reserves is
small compared to the economic consequences
of financial crises (Aizenman and Marion, 2003)
and/or exchange rate to float (Feldstein, 2002; Calvo
and Reinhart, 2003).1 However earning small yields
on reserves and paying higher interest on outstanding
liabilities, it would be still very costly to accumulate2
*Corresponding author. E-mail: suheyla@bilkent.edu.tr
1 Feldstein (2002) argues that the policymakers in Argentina were well aware of the coming crisis when they pursued the
pegged exchange rate regime but in order to keep their decade of price stability, they did not allow the exchange rate to float
and bear the consequence of the severe crisis in 2001.
2 Feldstein (1999) mentions that for Mexico, an additional US$30 billion in order to double its reserves would cost nearly
half-of-one per cent of its GDP per year. Bird and Rajan (2003) estimates similar figure for the recent Asian crisis and found
that annual cost of extra reserves is 0.3–1.0% of GDP for Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and South Korea in
1999.
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and hold large reserves for most of the developing
countries. In practice, it has been experienced that
the countries with greatest need for reserves econo-
mize more than others on their holdings especially,
when international markets are tight (Batten, 1982;
Landell-Mills, 1989). So the real challenge for the
monetary authorities of emerging markets would be
to augment international reserves to the level where
the estimated benefits are at least equal to the cost
of holding additional balances. In this paper, the aim
is to study a reserve level such that any sovereign
country can optimally control both the saving of
precautionary reserves and cost of idle stockpiles
under risk of economic contraction.
The reserve adequacy should vary amongst devel-
oping countries depending on the economic circum-
stances and the health of the financial institutions.
During financial panics, countries prone to capital
flight will rapidly lose their reserves when investors’
confidence disappears (Bird and Ramkishen, 2003).
Attaining adequate or more international reserves
for a heavily debted country would not be definite
considering the recent evidence in Korea that large
reserves did not make this country immune to
financial crisis. In this study, it is stressed that in
the determination of international reserve balances,
monetary authorities should consider the risk of
economic and/or financial turmoil and their possible
impacts on their national economies.
In the literature, as an alternative to rule-of-thumb
ratio analyses, international reserves are determined
by optimization methods (Heller, 1966; Frenkel and
Jovanovic, 1981; Landell-Mills, 1989; Ben-Bassat and
Gottlieb, 1992a). Although it has been argued that
optimizing approaches have operational shortcom-
ings, they allow monetary authorities to incorporate
more country specific information into consideration.
A common reserve goal for all countries ignores the
potential exposures to crises or attacks for a specific
country. In the determination of an optimal amount
of international liquidity, monetary authorities
minimize the cost of undesired output contractions
and foregone returns with fair prices respectively.
The paper particularly examines both the optimal
and the adequate level of international reserves
for Turkey during the period 1988–2002. In the
settlement of optimal reserve balances, monetary
authorities are assumed to consider the default risk
or vulnerability to a crisis and its impact on their
economy. By recent evidence from most of the
emerging markets, crises were followed by downturns
of GDP for a considerable period of time. Although
the output has not responded uniformly across
countries, there are approximate estimates of the
cumulative output losses for an emerging economy.
Adapting the early findings of output costs due to
crisis, the vulnerability of the Turkish economy to
external shocks over the sample period is estimated
to determine the expected value of the cost of
an attack under insufficient reserve holdings. In the
empirical model of vulnerability, it is found that
the exposure to economic and/or financial turmoil
in Turkey is not associated with the ratio of short-
term banking debts to reserves as in many early
examples3 but the ratio of capital inflows or outflows
to reserves over time. Reinhart and Reinhart (1998)
point out that the vulnerability of the financial
sector increases for countries where the weak domes-
tic banking system plays a dominant role in inter-
mediating the capital flows. After 1987, Turkish
commercial banks provided short-term capital inflows
to the economy extensively as an intermediate for
the government’s short-term borrowing needs for its
deficit. Ertu~grul and Selçuk (2002) discern that this
deficit financing led banks to open short positions in
foreign currency and exposed them to insolvency risk
due to exchange and/or interest rate shocks over the
last two decades. Similarly, in the paper it is observed
that the level of capital flows – in or out – with respect
to international reserves is perceived as an indication
of the vulnerability of Turkey.
Moreover, deposit dollarization (increasing the
share of the foreign currency deposits with respect to
the local currency ones) is another significant
indicator of the riskiness of the Turkish economy.
After the late-1980s, there is a persistent tendency of
Turkish depositors to hold much of their financial
wealth in foreign currency denominated deposits in
order to protect their wealth against a loss in value
due to high inflation and depreciation of the Turkish
Lira.4 Until the last twin crisis in 2001, highly dollar-
ized Turkish banks5 continued to collect foreign
currency denominated deposits and ignored to take
any prudent measures in the management of their
3 In many of the recent studies about Asian crisis, there are evidences on the association of short-term banking debts and the
subsequent financial crises. See Frankel and Rose (1996), Sachs et al. (1996), Edwards (1999), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999),
Radalet and Sachs (1998), Aizenman and Marion (2004).
4 The average annual inflation were 71.2% over the period between 1988 and 2002. For the same period, on average US dollar
appreciates 67.5% annually against Turkish Lira.
5 The share of foreign currency denominated assets (liabilities) in total assets (liabilities) increased from 26% (25%) in 1988 to
49.2% (55.8%) in 2002.
































assets and liabilities.6 Thus, the profitable short posi-
tions in foreign currency aggravated the vulnerability
of the whole banking sector. Even though the asset
substitution provides a hedge against exchange rate
risk for the domestic savers, it increases the possibility
of banks runs when the devaluation is impending
(Honohan and Shi, 2002; De Nicoló et al., 2003).
Hence, it is found that foreign investors increase
their expectation on default risk of Turkey by the
growing tendency of savers to hold more foreign
currency denominated deposits in the domestic banks.
According to the estimate of default probability,
the impact of crisis on the real economy and the
opportunity cost of holding reserves, it is observed
that Turkey did not hold optimal balances of foreign
reserves between 1988–2002. Nevertheless, the actual
level of official reserves would have been optimal with
an estimated expected cumulative damage of an
attack of about 5.2% of real output over the sample
period. However, the last 25 years of evidence on the
exposure of emerging economies to currency and/or
banking crises ended with higher costs to the national
economies of more than 15% of real GDP (see Bordo
et al., 2001; Hutchison and Noy, 2005). Hence, it is
concluded that Turkish monetary authorities should
expand the level of international reserves further in
order to minimize the expected costs under the threat
of economic and/or financial attacks. Moreover, it is
found that reserves are less than the adequate levels
considering the exchange rate regime, the country
risk and the early experiences in Turkey. In particu-
lar, reserves in Turkey with respect to broad money,
short-term debts and/or the combination of these are
found to be insufficient.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The
theoretical model with the empirical estimations and
the optimal reserves are presented in Section II. The
adequate and the official amounts of international
reserves for Turkey is compared in Section III.
The paper concludes with comments in Section IV.
II. A Theoretical Model for Optimum
International Reserve Level
The model
In the literature, there are many studies and reviews
on the determination of international reserves
starting from the 1960s. The recent paper by
Bahmani-Oskooee and Brown (2002) provided a
very comprehensive survey on the theoretical and
empirical developments of the issue. In the theoretical
models, the major concern of the monetary authority
is to determine the optimal level that minimizes
the net holding cost of reserves considering the risk
of default of a sovereign country under unexpected
economic events considering. As stated by Heller
(1966), ‘the optimal level of international reserves is
given by the amount which minimises the total cost
of adjusting and/or financing an external imbalance’.
The necessity of adjustment and financing of reserves
depends on the probability of any country facing
future shocks. In general, there is a tradeoff between
the precautionary motive of holding large reserves
for external fluctuations and the forgone earnings
on reserve holdings.7
In this paper, the work by Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb
(1992a) is used to solve the problem of a monetary
authority who governs the optimal reserve level, R*
by minimizing the following expected cost function,
min
R
EðTCÞ ¼ ð1 Þ rRþ C ð1Þ
where TC is total cost and E is the expectation opera-
tor. As a general simplifying convention, TC is the
summation of two expected costs. The first one is the
expected cost of forgone returns on reserve holdings,
R and the second one is the expected output loss, C
due to the countries in economic and/or a financial
crisis. By Equation 1, the monetary authority deter-
mines the optimal level of reserves by trading-off
output and return losses. In the model,  is the prob-
ability of a country’s default due to economic and/or
financial turmoil.8 In the previous theoretical and
empirical models, the reserves and the probability
of default are generally negatively related. Neverthe-
less, using the early evidence it is assumed that coun-
tries with large reserves defend themselves better
against crisis or its contagious effect. Hence, the
probability of failure can be described by
 ¼ f ðR, zÞ
@
@R
¼ R < 0 ð2Þ
z is a vector of economic variables that determines
the vulnerability or default risk of a country in
international bond markets. For instance, z includes
variables that represent the economic fundamentals
such as soundness of banking system. Sachs et al.
(1996) and Feldstein (1999) show that countries
with a good banking system have been expected to
be less exposes to external imbalances.
6 See Ertu~grul and Selçuk (2002) for the three stages of Turkish banking sector.
7 See for instance Heller (1966), Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981), Landell-Mills (1989), Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb (1992b).
8Reinhart (2002) found that about 85% of all the defaults in 59 countries during 1970–1999 are linked with currency crisis.
































In order to incorporate the impact of economic
and/or financial collapse into the total cost function,
the cumulative response of national output before
and after crisis is considered. Although there are
some contradicting empirical evidences9 on the
adverse impact of crises on economic growth, the
general outcome of economic and/or financial fail-
ures for emerging markets is an output contraction
for a period of time. Bordo et al. (2001) concludes
that over the last 120 years, crises have been followed
by downturns lasting on average 2 to 3 years and
costing 5 to 10 per cent of GDP. After the economic
and/or financial turmoil, there will be a slowdown in
the future flows of foreign credit and imported goods
to the domestic market and this will cause a setback
in growth of output for a while. In the paper, the
cumulative output losses, C is measured by using
the previous empirical findings on the output cost
of crises in emerging markets.
The overall opportunity cost of holding a given
amount of international reserves is a function of its
volume, R and the net opportunity cost of forgone
returns, r.10 The measure for cost of holding reserve
or foregone returns differ amongst emerging coun-
tries depending on their economic circumstances.
Especially, for the countries prone to crisis or heavily
debted, r will be more critical in the determination
of optimal reserve level. Since these countries mostly
accumulate reserves by internationally borrowing
instead of giving trade surpluses, the interest rates
charged to them, r increase significantly. Hence,
they may choose to economize more instead of
augmenting the reserve level at some adequate level.
From the total cost function which is the summa-
tion of the expected cost of failure, C and the oppor-
tunity cost, (1)rR the first order condition of the
problem (Equation 1) is
@EðTCÞ
@R
¼ RrRþ ð1 Þrþ RC ¼ 0
such that the optimal reserve balance depends on the
cost of failure, net opportunity cost and the absolute
and the marginal default probabilities at given reserve
level
R ¼







Since there is no explicit theoretical relation between
reserves and default probability, the empirical asso-
ciation of these variables is used in the determination
of R*. In the following subsection, the cost and
the probability of failure for Turkey will be esti-
mated to calculate the optimal reserves described in
(Equation 3). Thus, the optimal foreign currency
holdings of the Turkish monetary authorities will be
hypothesized during 1988–2002 period.
Estimation and results
Cost of failure. In the period of economic and/or
financial turmoil, a country might suffer a serious
decline in output. Yet, the degree of this fall back
is influenced by the initial economic conditions of
the specific country, the crisis management and
the rescue packages provided by the international
organizations (see Gupta et al., 2003; Dooley and
Verma, 2001). In the literature, there is still no single
or best way of measuring the output loss during crises
(Bordo et al., 2001). Hutchison and Noy (2005) argue
that there is also a paucity of empirical work related
to the output loss due to various crises. In the deter-
mination of the output cost of crises for Turkey, the
statistical estimates provided by Hutchison and Noy
(2005) in a panel data set for emerging economies
over 1975–1997 is applied.11
Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb (1992a) determine the
cost of failure by regressing the six years of dis-
counted output forgone to openness (import-to-out-
put ratio) for 13 countries over 1960–1982 period and
find that the cumulative loss or the difference between
potential and actual output over six-years period
9For instance, Gupta et al. (2003) find that in a sample of 278 currency crises across 125 countries between the 1970s and
1990s, over 40% of crises have been expansionary.
10 Since reserves have interest income, the opportunity cost is net of this value.
11 In the sample, periods of twin crisis are highlighted with bold letters: Banking Crises: Argentina (1980–1982, 1989–1990,
1995–1997), Brazil, (1990, 1994–1997), Chile (1976, 1981–1983), China (1982–1986), Columbia (1982, 1987), Costa Rica
(1987, 1994–1997), Indonesia (1994, 1997), Jordan (1989–1990), Korea (1997), Malaysia (1985–1988, 1997), Mauritius
(1996), Mexico (1981–1991, 1995–1997), Panama (1988–1989), Philippines (1981–1987, 1997), Singapore (1982), South Africa
(1977, 1985, 1989), Thailand (1983–1987, 1997), Trinidad and Tobago (1982–1993), Tunisia (1991–1995), Turkey (1982–1985,
1991, 1994–1995), Uruguay (1981–1984), Venezuela (1978–1986, 1994–1997). Currency Crises: Argentina (1975–1976,
1982–1983, 1989–1991), Brazil (1982–1983, 1987, 1990–1991, 1995), Chile (1985), Columbia (1985), Costa Rica (1981),
Indonesia (1978, 1983, 1986, 1997), Jordan (1983, 1987–1989, 1992), Korea (1980, 1997), Malaysia (1986, 1997), Malta
(1992, 1997), Mauritius (1979, 1981), Mexico (1976, 1982, 1985, 1994–1995), Philippines (1983–1984, 1986, 1997), Singapore
(1975), South Africa (1975, 1978, 1984–1986, 1996), Thailand (1981, 1984, 1997), Trinidad and Tobago (1985, 1988, 1993),
Tunisia (1993), Turkey (1978–1980, 1994), Uruguay (1982–1983), Venezuela (1984, 1986, 1994–1996).
































after default increases significantly for a country with
heavy trade flows. However, no statistically
significant relation between loss of output and open-
ness is observed when the date is updated and the
same model is regressed. Moreover, the duration of
crisis on the real economy decreases for the finan-
cially open economies further12 that the empirical
findings of Hutchison and Noy (2005) is studied to
determine the cost of output loss for Turkey.
In Hutchison and Noy (2005), real output growth
is regressed with lagged output growth, domestic
policy factors (changes in government budget surplus
and credit growth), structural factors (openness),
external factors (growth in foreign output and real
exchange rate overvaluation), and country specific
weighted average growth rate over the sample period
of past 25 years.13 According to their results,
currency (banking) crises reduce output by about 5–8
(8–10)% over two-four year period. Thus, in the cal-
culation of the optimal reserve levels for Turkey, the
output loss will be 1.27–2.06 (2.06–2.60)% in each
quarter related to currency (banking) crisis. More-
over, since it is found that annual output declines
by 13–18% due to the combined effect of the
two crises, the quarterly fall of output is about
3.42–4.84% due to twin crisis. In a similar study by
Bordo et al. (2001) including both the industrial and
emerging economies, the cumulative output losses are
measured for the 1973–1997 period by 13% of GDP
for currency and banking crises in total, and 16%
for twin crises. In summary, the optimal level of inter-
national reserves for Turkey is calculated considering
the impact of 5–18% of output contractions due to
various types of crises.14
Probability of failure. In order to compute the
subjective probability of failure, the premium paid on
government’s foreign currency borrowings is used to
measure country risk (see Edwards, 1984; Gottlieb,
1989; Landell-Mills, 1989; Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb,
1992a). The financial markets assess the default prob-
abilities and reflect these risks by charging a higher
premium or spread on foreign borrowing of a sover-
eign country. Thus, the spread is the difference
between the interest rate, i charged to a risky country
and the riskless country loan rate or LIBOR, i*.
According to expectations theory, the investors’
view of the expected probability of default of an
individual country to the creditors is extracted as,15
ð1 Þð1þ iÞ ¼ ð1þ i Þ ð4Þ
where it is assumed that the lender requires an
expected return on risky country loan equal to at
least the risk-free return.16 More explicitly, under a
competitive loan market, the discounted expected
profit of a risk neutral lender will be zero.17 Hence,
the relation between the spread, i i * and the failure
probability,  will be as follows
i  i  ¼

1 
ð1þ i Þ ð5Þ
Thus, for a given value of risk-free rate, spread
increases for a country with higher risk, .18
According the recent studies on the determination
of the vulnerability of developing countries, the
popular indicative factors like current account deficit,
debt/export ratios, fiscal deficits, rate of inflation etc.
do not appear to be significant anymore.19 In partic-
ular, it has been evidenced that crises are spreading
mainly to the countries with weak banking and low
liquid reserves with respect to external and internal
liabilities. In the light of these studies. Table 1
summarizes the result of the regression analysis for
the determination of spread reflecting the inter-
national credit risk of Turkey.
In this empirical analysis, it is identified that short-
term capital flows to reserves (STCF/R), the ratio
12 See Calvo and Reinhart (2000) for the empirical evidences on the average duration it takes to return to ‘normal’ after
currency and banking crises.
13 See Hutchison and Noy (2005) for the details of the model and how their formulation avoids various biases. The model is
mainly estimated by Hausman and Taylor procedure and the robustness tests with other methods such as LSDV and GMM
are also provided in the paper.
14 These figures might underestimate the loss of output over time. In the period of general slow down, the impact of crisis on
the cumulative loss will be small since GDP has already declined.
15 The similar analyses have been done for the determination of credit risk or expected default rate for corporate bonds and
loans in the financial intermediation market. See Altman and Arman (2002) for the calculation of default probabilities and
risk premiums for different risk-rated corporations in each year for US market.
16 It is assumed that loans are one year maturity.
17Under perfect competition, risk neutral investor’s US$1 turns either i discounted with safe rate, i* or zero. Thus, the
expected profit, (1)( 1þ [(1þ i)/(1þ i *)])þ( 1þ 0) is zero where  is the probability of default. See Appendix in
Gottlieb (1989) for the further discussions.
18Gottlieb (1989) explicitly derived Equation 5 under a competitive loan market where both the lenders and the borrowers are
risk neutral.
19 For instance, see Frankel and Rose, 1996; Sachs et al., 1996; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Aizenman and Marion, 2004.
































of foreign currency to domestic currency deposits of
banks (FCD/LCD) and the average propensity to
import (Import/GNP) significantly explain the risk
perception of the foreign lenders in the Turkish
Eurobond market during 1988–2002.20 It is found
that the variables in the estimated risk premium
equation are at the expected signs. The relationship
between ratio of short-term capital flows to reserves
and spread is positive as expected. It has been widely
evidenced that financial capital can depart just as
rapidly as they arrived so, there is a genuine risk on
them leading to severe macroeconomic instabilities
(Calvo et al., 1996; Summers, 2000). In Turkey,
cross-border financial flows are in general short-
term, volatile and mostly intermediated by domestic
banks. After 1989, commercial banks which were the
main source of demand for the government debt
instruments, played a significant role in the short-
term financing of the government. However, the
existence of generous deposit insurance for both
local and foreign currency deposits and weak banking
supervision in Turkey, commercial banks ignored risk
management at their own peril.21 Especially profit-
able short positions during the sample period and
mismatches between the currency denomination of
bank loans and the currency denomination of
incomes of the local business increased their vulner-
ability (see Reinhart and Reinhart, 1998; Ertu~grul
and Selçuk, 2002). As seen in Table 1, increase in
the short-term capital flows – whether in or out –
with respect to international reserves is considered
as an indication of increasing financial vulnerability.
Since the major proportion of these capitals flows
were intermediated by the fragile banks of Turkey
during the sample period, it is found that risk pre-
mium on foreign borrowings of Turkey increases with
the increase in the flows of gross capital stock.
Furthermore, it is found that deposit dollarization
has significant influence in the measurement of the
probability of failure for Turkey. Since the 1980s,
domestic savers were allowed to hold foreign cur-
rency denominated deposits. Generally, the ratio of
foreign to local currency deposits overestimates the
dollarization impact on the domestic market since it
ignores the non-bank holdings of financial instru-
ments. Yet, FCD/LCD is significant in determining
the risk premiums on Turkish Eurobonds. De Nicoló
et al. (2003) empirically show that financially
dollarized economies are exposed to both solvency
and liquidity risks. When there is an anticipation of
devaluation, this will weaken the solvency of both
banks and the borrowers. In particular, the credit
risk deriving from a significant devaluation may
increase the risk of deposit withdrawals by concerned
depositors (liquidity risk) and lead to bank runs.
Hence, the deposit and eventually asset dollarization
of banks in weak currency economies such as in
Turkey increase the vulnerability of the whole finan-
cial system. In the paper, it is found that increasing
propensity of domestic savers to hold more foreign
currency denominated deposits during the sample
period significantly indicates the vulnerability of
the domestic economy to various shocks. Hence,
the premium charged on the financial instruments
of Turkey in the international markets is higher.
In the empirical model to estimate the probability
of failure, various traditional variables such as
debt/export ratio, debt/reserve ratio, government
expenditures to output ratio, average propensity to
invest, rate of inflation, currency account deficit,
etc. are also studied but no explanatory relation is
found during the sample period. Only the ratio of
imports to GNP which is generally known as the
proxy for marginal propensity to import and/or the
degree of openness weakly explains the risk premiums
on the foreign borrowings. An increase in the trade
relations with the rest of the world has mitigating
impact on the borrowing rates in the international
arena.
20 Because of the existence of autocorrelation in the OLS regression, the same model is estimated by GMM where the
significance of short-term capital flows to reserves and import/GNP ratio decease to 20 and 11% level respectively.
21 After 1994, the partial explicit deposit insurance coverage was extended to full insurance for all domestic deposits including
the foreign currency denominated ones. However, the common perception in the public is that there has been a blanket
guarantee in Turkey after 1994.





Intercept 3.4482 3.90 2.69
exp(STCF/R) 1.2808 2.33 1.67
ln(FCD/LCD) 1.2761 4.91 3.85





Note:  is derived from Equation 5 as lnði  i Þ=ð1þ i Þ ¼
ln=ð1 Þ.
































Therefore, the adjusted spread equation which will
be used to approximate the probability of default is
as follows
ln













Using Equations 5 and 6, the change in probability of
default by an increase in reserves (marginal prob-
ability of default) is derived as
@
@R
¼ R ¼ ð1 Þ
STCF
R2
1:2808eSTCF=R < 0 ð7Þ
Equation 7 suggests that for a given balance of inter-
national reserves at time t, the marginal probability
of failure increases as long as the capital is flowing
out (STCF<0).
Optimal level of international reserves for Turkey. In
two previous subsections the cost and the prob-
ability of failure for Turkey is determined. Using
these estimates, the optimal level of reserves
in 1988Q1–2002Q4 is calculated by substituting
Equations 6, 7, the output loss, C and the opportu-
nity cost, r into Equation 3. As mentioned before,
for the countries accumulating reserves by borrowing
internationally instead of running trade surplus,
the opportunity cost will be significant for the deter-
mination of the optimal balances. Although the
opportunity cost varies in most empirical analysis
of foreign reserves,22 international borrowing rates
are assumed to be the appropriate cost measure for
Turkey (see Table A1 in Appendix).
The optimal reserve paths considering the possible
impacts of currency, banking and twin crises on real
output are reported respectively in Fig. 2 (see for-
ward, see also Table A1. During 1988Q1–2002Q4, it
is found that the official reserves mostly fall short
of optimal amounts. It is apparent that even
though there has been an increasing trend in the
accumulation of international reserves since the
currency crisis in 1994, there are few episodes where
the official reserves are also optimal.23 Still, the actual
reserves considering the 5% loss on national output
due to currency crisis, move very close to the optimal
path (see upper panel in Fig. 1). More precisely, start-
ing from the first quarter of 1988 to the last quarter
of 2002, the accumulated official reserves by the
Central Bank would be considered as optimal only
if the expected cumulative loss of output due to crisis
were about 5.2% with given opportunity cost for
Turkey.24 However, the recent crises in the last 25
years ended with more output losses in national
economies. Hence, this amount might be interpreted
as an indication of inadequate reserve holding
of the monetary authorities in Turkey during
1988–2002 period.
Yet, this result is hypothesized statistically in order
to test whether the official, R and the calculated
optimal reserves, R* are pairwise significantly
different-for all crises episodes during the sample
period. Thus, the optimal behaviour of monetary
authorities to avoid currency, banking or twin crises
at reasonable cost is examined. First, the difference, dt
between Rt and R

t at time t is calculated. Then, it is
hypothesized that if the official and the optimal
reserves do not differ significantly, the mean change,
dð¼d=nÞ will be zero, H0 : d ¼ 0. According to
t-statistics reported in Table 2, on average, the official
and the optimal reserves are not pairwise same except
for one case. The hypothesis that d ¼ 0 fails to be
rejected at 10% significance level for the currency
crisis with real GDP loss of 5%. However, under
the threat of economic and/or financial crisis with
output cost of more than 5%, the optimal balances
for Turkey are found to be short of the official levels.
III. Adequate Level of
International Reserves
In the early analyses, the reserve-to-imports ratio
was part of the reserve management policies.
22 For instance, Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb (1992a) provide empirical evidence using Israel economy that the difference between
the real return on capital and reserves measures the opportunity cost properly. They justify that this definition is in accordance
with the theoretical meaning. On the other hand, Landell-Mills (1989) argues the opposite that the theoretical definition
underestimates the cost for the countries with debt-servicing difficulty. When reserves are borrowed, the borrowing rates will
be higher than the marginal returns on domestic investment. Yet, when reserves are not borrowed, but the government
guarantees international liabilities, the value of these liabilities to the monetary authorities is so high for the sake of country’s
credit standing that they pay off external debt before investing domestically.
23 Strikingly, over all quarters of 2001, the official reserves are above the optimal levels. This result might be misleading since
there was significant decline in real GDP (almost 24.5%) due to twin crisis in that year.
24 If a constant proportion of GDP losses due to crisis is defined as , then  which makes the official reserves on average
optimal is derived from Equation 3 as ¼ [R (1)/(Rr)](r/Y) when Y is real GDP.
































Although the rationale for using this scaling was
never fully justified, it is still used in the reserve ade-
quacy discussions especially for the countries at early
stages of development that have no significant access
to international financial markets (De Beaufort
Wijnholds and Kapteyn, 2001; Bird and Ramkishen,
2003). In recent practices, reserve adequacy measures
basically are influenced by the internal and external
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Fig. 1. Optimal versus official reserve levels
































drain of financial assets during crises. Hence, reserve-
to-broad money, reserve-to-short-term debts and/or
the combination of these two ratios become the
significant determinants of international reserve
adequacy for emerging economies.
Broad money (M2) and short-term-debts (STD)
are used to assess the potential demand for foreign
assets from domestic and foreign sources respectively.
Yet the level of adequate reserves depends on
the foreign exchange policies, capital controls and
various other financial states of the economies.
In Fig. 2, three rule-of-thumb adequacy measures
for Turkey are presented. In the first measure,
which is suggested by De Beaufort Wijnholds and
Kapteyn (2001), the adequate level of reserve balance
is found by summing total short-term debts (similar
to Guidotti rule) with a certain fraction of M2
adjusted with country risk.25 The 10–20% of M2
is proposed as the expected internal drain in the
countries with managed floated exchange rate
regime like in Turkey.26 The summation of short-
term debts and 10% of M2 adjusted with the
Turkey’s country risk is reported as Rdbwk in Fig. 2.
It is apparent that during 1988–2002, the official
reserves, R are below Rdbwk. Moreover, Turkey’s
official reserves were lower than her short-term debt
(STD) obligations until 1997. Later in 1997–1999,
R was barely sufficient for foreign debts but still
inadequate with respect to Rdbwk. After 2001, R is
above Rdbwk.
25 As suggested by De Beaufort Wijnholds and Kapteyn (2001), the country risk for Turkey is obtained from the Economic
Intelligence Unit of The Economist.
26De Beaufort Wijnholds and Kapteyn (2001) argues that it is 5–10% for floating exchanged regimes.

























Fig. 2. Rule-of-thumb adequacy measures and short-term debts
Table 2. Paired-difference experiment for R and R*, H0: dV0ðnV60Þ
Real GDP loss due to
Currency or banking crisis Twin crisis














1.681 6.335 8.196 9.979 11.618
Note: sd and s d are the estimate for standard deviation of the individual and mean differences respectively.
































The other two rule-of-thumb adequacy measures
are computed with the summation of total short-
term debts and certain proportion of different money
aggregates. Feldstein (1999) emphasizes that the
amount of convertible foreign currency deposits in
commercial banks has to be considered in order to
ensure sufficient international liquidity for the risk
of capital flight by domestic residents. Here, M2Y
which is the summation of M2 and foreign currency
denominated deposits, is found an appropriate
monetary aggregate to measure the internal drain of
foreign currency under crisis threat. It has been
experienced that M2Y declined significantly during
the last two crises of Turkey. In the second quarter
of 1994, the contraction on M2Y was about 24%
whereas it was about 10% in aggregate, starting
from the last quarter of 2000 to the second quarter
of 2001 (see Fig. 3). The smaller flight in 2001 crisis
can be explained by the existence of full deposit insur-
ance guarantee even to the foreign currrency deposits
after 1994. Although the deposits are hedged against
both the liquidity and the exchange rate risks, fear
of freezing of the deposit accounts caused the 10%
contraction of M2Y in 2001. RM2Y is calculated by
summing the total short-term debts with 10%
of M2Y. Similarly the official reserves are clearly
below the adequate amounts, RM2Y (see Fig. 2).
Lastly, RM2R is calculated as another rule-
of-thumb adequacy measure for Turkey. In the
monetary aggregate called M2R, Repurchase
Agreements (Repos) are added to M2. Since the
introduction in 1991, Repos have a considerable
share in the monetary aggregates of Turkey. During
1991–2002, the proportion of Repos to time deposits
(local currency denominated ones) were about
40%. Hence, it is considered that the measurement
of domestic capital flight using M2R will be
quite practical. Using again the recent experiences
of crisis in Turkey, it is found that the contraction
in M2R and Repos were about 20% and 50%
respectively in both crises (see Fig. 3). Thus, RM2R
which is obtained by summing 100% of STD and
20% of M2R is compared with the official interna-
tional reserves of Turkey during 1988–2002 period.
Once again, it is concluded that the actual foreign
reserves are less than the adequate levels.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper, the official international reserves of
Turkey is tested against optimality and adequacy.
The optimal time path of the reserves for any sover-
eign country is determined using the theoretical
model á la Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb (1992a). In the
empirical study, the model is modified for Turkey.
Thus, in the estimation of probability of failure
under insufficient amount of reserve holdings, it is
found that the factors related to financial markets,
especially the banking sector fragility explain the
riskiness of Turkey in the view of international
investors. In particular, increasing deposit dollariza-
tion in the saving institutions and gross capital
flows – in or out – significantly indicate the vulner-
ability of Turkey. According to the estimated default
probabilities, opportunity cost of holding reserves
and the cumulative cost of failure under crisis, the
optimal reserve level for each quarter of 1988–2002
is derived. It is observed that the actual amounts are
mostly less than the optimal levels. More precisely,
the actual reserves are only optimal when the
expected cumulative contraction is about 5.2% of
real GDP under crisis. However, the early evidence
in emerging economies and Turkey show that crises
hit more heavily. Hence, it is found that the current
financial structure in Turkey such as no capital con-
trol and highly dollarized banking system necessitates
more foreign reserves for preventing any future
shocks.










































Fig. 3. M2Y with foreign currency deposits (FCD) and M2R
































Moreover, three rule-of-thumb adequacy amounts
are computed considering mainly the domestic
and foreign capitals flights during crisis periods.
The similar results are obtained that the official
reserves fall short of the adequate levels during the
sample period. The determination of international
reserves for emerging economies is part of the efforts
to strengthen these economies’ immunity to crises.
It has been usually experienced that the countries
with greatest need for reserves economize more than
others on their holdings since they might under-
estimate the cost of crisis. Turkey is also another
example of a country that has to improve her
reserves to provide international confidence.
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Appendix
Table A1. Simulation results





1988Q1 0.254 0.011 0.035 19.390 1.593 7.042 26.752
0.197 0.015 0.025 20.825 1.924 10.646 40.441
0.222 0.030 0.020 29.011 1.983 18.551 70.473
0.147 0.020 0.011 19.683 2.480 22.442 85.253
1989Q1 0.129 0.017 0.007 18.919 2.020 36.086 137.084
0.166 0.001 0.014 20.477 2.661 18.683 70.973
0.233 0.002 0.017 29.196 3.982 21.767 82.689
0.171 0.000 0.023 20.376 4.537 11.123 42.255
1990Q1 0.195 0.010 0.025 20.952 4.761 10.857 41.242
0.218 0.008 0.025 23.205 5.685 11.726 44.543
0.244 0.003 0.027 31.020 6.398 14.604 55.478
0.198 0.004 0.028 22.148 5.759 9.928 37.713
1991Q1 0.142 0.010 0.043 20.860 3.766 6.173 23.451
0.225 0.001 0.046 23.094 4.756 6.350 24.124
0.250 0.009 0.052 32.245 5.046 7.856 29.844
0.247 0.004 0.050 21.990 4.813 5.584 21.213
1992Q1 0.266 0.007 0.070 22.573 3.768 4.097 15.563
0.403 0.021 0.060 24.401 4.438 5.179 19.673
0.460 0.004 0.052 33.970 5.715 8.323 31.617
0.408 0.004 0.053 23.190 6.107 5.560 21.120
1993Q1 0.435 0.012 0.048 23.682 7.080 6.231 23.671
0.448 0.009 0.044 27.164 6.805 7.805 29.649
0.550 0.006 0.037 36.488 6.863 12.509 47.521
0.473 0.003 0.040 25.137 6.277 8.009 30.425
1994Q1 0.449 0.017 0.034 24.912 3.271 9.398 35.700
0.368 0.022 0.025 24.261 4.257 12.353 46.925
0.388 0.009 0.082 33.641 6.741 5.214 19.806
0.422 0.003 0.073 23.756 6.906 4.160 15.803
1995Q1 0.529 0.014 0.065 24.539 11.292 4.811 18.276
0.379 0.003 0.041 27.545 13.350 8.581 32.598
1995Q3 0.393 0.001 0.035 36.661 16.572 13.407 50.931
0.295 0.004 0.034 25.329 12.043 9.416 35.769
1996Q1 0.375 0.003 0.029 26.666 14.162 11.547 43.864
0.366 0.003 0.032 29.771 15.481 11.784 44.765
0.382 0.001 0.035 38.601 17.332 14.039 55.329
0.322 0.000 0.030 27.111 16.386 11.666 44.317
1997Q1 0.298 0.001 0.031 28.510 15.685 11.637 44.207
0.352 0.002 0.024 32.293 16.524 17.475 66.385
0.374 0.000 0.018 41.316 20.535 29.662 112.680
0.312 0.001 0.022 29.222 18.610 16.976 64.489
1998Q1 0.363 0.001 0.021 31.144 22.097 19.154 72.762
0.342 0.000 0.030 33.342 26.134 14.092 53.534
0.339 0.002 0.072 42.418 22.020 7.487 28.441
0.429 0.004 0.064 28.860 19.718 5.703 21.666
1999Q1 0.313 0.000 0.059 28.596 21.193 6.213 23.600
0.303 0.000 0.053 32.612 21.937 7.814 29.683
0.358 0.000 0.052 39.765 23.587 9.723 36.936
0.306 0.000 0.044 28.254 23.177 8.123 30.860
(continued )






































2000Q1 0.314 0.001 0.033 30.200 22.926 11.655 44.275
0.332 0.000 0.025 34.871 24.547 17.785 67.564
0.398 0.000 0.027 42.884 24.530 20.278 77.034
0.360 0.001 0.054 30.670 25.097 7.172 27.245
2001Q1 0.260 0.001 0.086 29.900 18.796 4.449 16.902
0.278 0.004 0.069 31.458 16.379 5.813 22.081
0.459 0.001 0.085 39.661 18.751 5.935 22.545
0.411 0.003 0.055 27.500 18.892 6.405 24.332
2002Q1 0.416 0.000 0.033 30.524 20.520 11.767 44.700
0.401 0.000 0.071 34.271 23.139 6.167 23.428
0.454 0.001 0.043 42.804 25.171 12.538 47.631
2002Q4 0.429 0.000 0.044 30.628 27.006 8.847 33.608
Note: Reserves, R and GDP are in billions of dollars. Ri% denotes the optimal reserves when the expexted loss of GDP is i.
Source: The Central Bank of Republic of Turkey.
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